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I.
A.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Issue.
In 1976 Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, instituted a Four Year Plan (FYP) of

agricultural growth and ethnic purges. 1 Millions of Cambodians were removed from
their homes and jobs and forced to participate in an agricultural communal. Millions
of others were wrongfully charged with betraying the party and forced to live in
torture camps, the most infamous being S-21.

2

Numerous accounts from S-21 note

that prisoners were left in custody without food, water and medical attention, while
Khmer cadres and soldiers ate the little rice harvested in the agricultural communal. 3
Other accounts report farmers working twelve hour days with little or no food.

4

This memorandum addresses whether charges of Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity, or Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention apply to the mass starvation
and denial of medical services experienced by those held against th eir will by the
Khmer Rouge. 5 It will additionally address whether those responsible for the FYP had
to foresee these conditions to be held responsible. *

1

David Chandler, Big Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot , Westview Press (1992)
p.114 .David Chandler was a United States foreign services officer in Cambodia in the early 1960’s.
As a history professor he is now a recognized academic authority on the Pol Pot regime. In addition
to authoring Big Brother Number One he has also translated Favorite Stories of Cambodia and Voices
from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison ; Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic
Kampuchea(1975-1979), Documentation Center of Cambodia (2007) Chapter 6 p.1 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 12].
2

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of Cambodia
(2007) Chapter 9, p.1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12].
3

Craig Etcheson, Mapping Project of 1999: The Analysis, Documentation Center of Cambodia (2007)
p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11]
4

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of Cambodia
(2007) Chapter 6, p.1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12]
5

The inclusion of the FYP participants with those imprisoned in S -21 as victims is a broad
interpretation of the phrase “held against their will.” As will be discussed in the factual background,

1

B.

Summary of Conclusions

1.

Mass starvation and denial of medical services cannot be charged as
Genocide under the ECCC statute.
Mass starvation and denial of medical services caused serious bodily and

mental harm to those forced to grow rice, and those imprisoned in S -21. 6 However,
there is no evidence that it was done intentionally to destroy a nationality, ethnic, or
racial group, as made necessary by the ECCC statute for the crime of Genocide. 7
2.

Mass starvation and denial of medical services cannot be charged as a
Crime Against Humanity under the ECCC statute.
Mass starvation and denial of medical services fulfill the elements of

extermination, torture, persecution, or other inhumane acts under Crimes Against
Humanity. 8 However, there is no evidence that the Khmer Rouge committed such acts

those who participated in the FYP were “held against their will” when forced to leave the ir homes,
families, and jobs, to participate in a trade they knew nothing about. Minutes from a Khmer Rouge
committee meeting state popular opinion had it that, “the Angkar prison [was] a large prison, without
walls or iron fetters, but no one can escape. ” Howard De Nike, Genocide in Cambodia, (Philadelphia,
UPENN Press 2000). p. 469. Consequently, this memorandum will address the likelihood of the
ECCC being able to prosecute the Khmer Rouge leaders both for the torture camps, and for those that
died as a result of the FYP.
*

Original phrasing of the issue: Can the mass starvation of a population and denial of medical
services, particularly modern medicine to a population under involuntary detention, be charged as
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, or Gra ve Breaches of the Geneva Conventions as defined under
the ECCC statute? What level of foreseeability is required for the policy makers in order for them to
be held responsible for the starvation, illness and death of the population?
6

Craig Etcheson, Mapping Project of 1999: The Analysis, Documentation Center of Cambodia (2007)
p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11] Craig Etcheson is a principal founder of the
Documentation Center of Cambodia. Etcheson research focuses on ways to help nations recovering
from genocide and other extreme violence. He has written several treatises on extreme conflict,
including The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea.
7

Ward Churchill, Defining the Unthinkable, 2 ORRIL 3, (2007) p. 33[]; ECCC Statute Article 4
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 2].
8

Christa Rottensteiner, The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime under Internation Law,
835 International Review of the Red Cross, (1999) p. 555 -582[ reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 10]; Christa Rottensteiner is a writer for the International Committee of the Red
Cross and has drafted several scholarly articles on their behalf covering the topic of humanitarian
assistance in the scope of international conflicts.

2

as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed at a civilian population based
on national, ethnic, or religious grounds. 9
3.

Mass starvation and denial of medical services can be charged as a Grave
Breach of the Geneva Convention under the ECCC statute .
Mass starvation and denial of medical services fulfill the elements of inhumane

treatment, willful killing, and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, and can be charged as Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention.
4.

10

Policy makers can be held responsible even if they did not specifically
foresee starvation, illness and death.
Under the legal theory of joint criminal enterprise, responsible parties do not

have to specifically foresee starvation, illness and death.

11

Khmer Rouge policy

makers can be held responsible for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention because
the resulting starvation, illness and death was a foreseeable event based on the type of
policies instituted and the known histories of officers used to implement the policies. 12

9

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of Cambodia
(2007) Chapter 9 p.1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12]; ECCC Statute Article 5
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 3].
10

Christa Rottensteiner, The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime under International Law,
835 International Review of the Red Cross, (1999) p. 564 [ reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 10].
11

Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility unde r the Doctrine of Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J Int Crim. Justice 109 (2007)116 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 14]. Antonio Cassese was the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Perons Responsible for Serious Violatio ns of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. He additionally is a leading authority on the development of the
legal doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise and has been cited by both the ICTR and ICTY.
12

Id.

3

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

Party History

1.

Early Communist Movement
In the spring of 1950, a delegation of 200 Cambodians cooperated with the

Vietnamese against the French in what would be later called the Indochina War. 13 The
Cambodian delegates came together to form the Unified Issarak Front or the Khmer
Issarak. 14 Although most members of the Front were native Cambodians, “some were
nationalist students who became communist while studying abroad, including Pol Pot,
Son Sen, and leng Sary.” 15 Four years later when the war ended, members of a secret
committee within the Khmer Issarak-- called the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party- formed a legitimate party to contest the elections set up by Cambodia’s signing of
the Geneva Agreements.

16

By the 1970’s the party gained in size, cut ties with

Vietnam, strengthened relations with China, and most importantly aligned itself along
the Vietnamese boarder outside the military reaches of ruling Cambodian prince
Sihanouk. 17

13

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 2 p.1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12]
14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

4

2. Khmer Rouge Domination
In the interval spanning 1970-1975, Cambodia experienced an intense period
of, “foreign interventions, bombardment, and civil war.” 18 This all came to a climax
in 1975 when the Khmer Issarak-dubbed by Prince Sihanouk “Khmer Rouge”officially came to power. 19 “The Khmer Rouge (KR) forced about two million Phnom
Penh residents, including over a million wartime refugees into the countryside.
Within a week, the people of Phnom Penh and other cities that had been controlled by
the government were moved to rural areas to do agricultural work.” 20 Those who
served as civil servants or soldiers in the former government, along with those
accused of stealing and desertion, were sent to prisons for detention, interrogation,
and execution. 21
B.

The Four Year Plan
Hoping to make Cambodia completely independent in both the economic and

political sphere, Pol Pot introduced his plan for socialism in education, agriculture,
industry, health, and welfare at a 1975 Agriculture Committee Meeting. 22 This plan
called for, “the Cambodian average rice yield to increase to 3 metric tons per hectare
by the beginning of 1977, and the country’s rice production to double between 1977

18

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 3 p.1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12].
19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 8 p.1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12].
22

David Chandler, Big Brother Number One, Westview Press (1999) p. 114 ;

5

and 1980.” 23 These expectations were based on the Myth of Funan which dates back
to 1000 A.D. 24 In several versions of the myth there is discussion of the defeat of a
Cham king, water covering the land of Funan, and a rice surplus due to the favor of
the gods in granting fertility and mastery of the flood plains. 25
FYP policy makers believed that the same kind of, “mastery over the water
problem was critical to increasing agricultural production.” 26 As a consequence,
hundreds of thousands of Cambodians were forced to dig ditches and build dikes, by
hand or with rudimentary tools, in water control const ruction projects. 27 The policy
makers, however, ignored the difficulties of implementing this plan and the miseries
that flowed inevitably from the overwork. 28 The FYP proved to be impossible because
Cambodians had never been forced to produce that much ri ce on a national scale
before. Without the proper tools, farm animals, and skilled workforce, rice production
never reached the required levels. 29
Because rice production never reached the planned levels, almost no rice was
saved for the Cambodian people or for seed. 30 Instead, most of the harvest was used to

23

Chad Raymond, Regional Geographic Influence on Two Khmer Politics , JTWS, Spring 2005 p.3
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 15]
24

Id. at 2

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 6 p.1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12] ; Howard De Nike,
Genocide in Cambodia, (Philadelphia, UPENN Press ) 2000. p.469[reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 34]
29

Id.

30

Id.

6

feed the army or was exported to China. 31 Mam Phai, a Cambodian girl whose family
worked in the country side recounted how her entire family died:
My 7-year old sister was killed because she stole on e ear of corn to eat. She
was hit with a hoe and buried near the corn farm…Two months later, my 70
year old grandmother died; she was accused of stealing rice porridge from
children and was clubbed to death…Several days later my mother died of
overwork and malnutrition. 32
Prisoners were forced to work 12 – 16- hour days without rest because “laziness was a
form of opposition to the regime.” 33 Forced to eat crickets, scorpions, and
cockroaches, many died from physical exhaustion and malnutrition. With “dy sentery,
beriberi, cholera, malaria, and other illnesses widespread,” and no available medical
care, deaths from starvation, disease, and over work, probably account for 50 -70
percent of deaths during the period. 34
Policy makers must have known the levels of production required by the FYP
were unrealistically high since previous production never exceeded 1 hectare per year.
Pol Pot, however, renounced any possible objections to the plan -- created by, “leaders
who had never planted, transplanted, or harvested,” rice--stating “Cambodia is not

31

Id.

32

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 8 p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12]
33

Howard De Nike, Genocide in Cambodia, (Philadelphia, UPENN Press) 2000. p.469[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 34]
34

Id.; Ben Kiernan, The demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia
1975-1979, and East Timor, 1975-80, 35 East Asian Studies 4 (2003) p. 587;[ reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 4] Ben Kiernan was founding Director of the Cambodian Genocide
Program at Yale and creator of the Yale East Timor Project. Kiernan's edited collection Conflict and
Change in Cambodia won the Critical Asian Studies Prize for 2002, and was republished as a b ook in
2006. He is also the editor of Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United
Nations, and the International Community , and Burchett: Reporting the Other Side of the World,
1939-1983, and co-editor of Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea, Pol Pot Plans the Future:
Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976 -1977, and The Specter of
Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective .

7

like other cautious countries.” Then end effect of the FYP placed a quixotic task upon
the shoulders of an ill-prepared population. 35
1. Effects on the Economy
The mass starvation of the Cambodian population can also be linked to the
devastating effects the FYP had on the Cambodian economy. Before the introduction
of the FYP Cambodia boasted 100 industrial enterprises both government and
privately owned, as well as, close to 4,000 skilled -labor businesses. 36 Under the
control of Khmer policy makers all 4,000 skilled -labor businesses were closed and the
only industrial factories allowed to operate were for the sole benefit of Khmer
officers. 37 All forms of outside communication were cut off including telephone,
telegraph, and postal mail. 38
The lack of skilled labor industries forced farmers to use rudimentary tools,
including bare hands, to dig ditches and plant seed, thus slowing any rice production
that could have been completed. 39 Other crops “such as cotton, maize, beans, and
sugar cane were completely abandoned.” 40 Similarly, the availability of tilled land
diminished from the lack of farm animals that were replaced with men. 41

35

David Chandler, Big Brother Number One, Westview Press (1999) p. 116

36

Howard De Nike, Genocide in Cambodia, (Philadelphia, UPENN Press) 2000. p.351[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 34]
37

Id.

38

Id. at 352.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 353

8

Although situated next to one of the most densely populated fishing lakes in the
world, all fishing instruments were destroyed and fishermen were sent to work in rice
paddies 42 While previous totals usually ended around 100,000 tons, 43 under Khmer
FYP policies, fishing yielded a mere 25,000 to 30,000 tons a year. Reports by the
People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) from the August 1979 trial of Pol Pot and leng
Sary state that, “out of a total population of more than 7 million people more than 3
million died,” as a result of the physical and economic repercussions of the FYP. 44
2. Detention Camps
To create the society envisioned by the regime, Khmer Rouge policy makers
believed Cambodians had to be clean in terms of their mentality and background. 45
Khmer policy makers divided their enemies into “internal enemies” and “external
enemies.” 46 The internal purges inside Cambodia began with those who were students,
vendors, or civil servants, but quickly spread to Khmer Rouge cadres themselves. 47
Living by the phrase, “It is better to arrest ten people by mistake than to let one guilty
person go free,” Khmer officers arrested any suspected “enemies,” for offenses as
small as wearing glasses. 48 Once arrested, detainees were taken to various prisons of

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 354.

45

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea(1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 8 p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12]
46

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 8 p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12]
47

Craig Etcheson, Mapping Project of 1999: The Analysis, Documentation Center of Cambodia
(2007) p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11]
48

Id. at 2

9

differing security levels. Accounts from lower level prisons state, “guards often
shackled certain classes of prisoners, and then left them restrained without food and
sometimes without water, until they expired from starvation and dehydration.” 49
Prisoners in the high security S-21 detention center were given food twice a day and
were bathed with a spray hose every four days. 50 With living conditions at S-21 being
subpar at best, most prisoners constantly, “suffered from ringworms, rashes, or lic e.” 51
Military leaders did not oppose any detention policies instituted by Pol Pot
because of the extreme “security measures” put in place by the Khmer Rouge. When
Khmer leaders Hou You and Hu Nim openly spoke out against Pol Pot and pushed for
reforms, both were murdered. 52 “As leadership purges accelerated so did the murder of
those who had served under the previous cadres in virtually in capacity.” 53 Etcheson,
lead analyst of the Documentation Center of Cambodia’s Mapping Project, estimates
that only a handful of Cambodians survived the torture camps. 54
3. Availability of Medical Services
The lack of medical services for the involuntary agricultural workers and S -21
detainees can also be attributed to the overall lack of trained physicians. At the same

49

Kamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuch ea(1975-1979), Documentation Center of
Cambodia (2007) Chapter 8 p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12]
50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Ben Kiernan, Do Not Blame Me It was My Prime Minister, 6 The Long Term View 3 (Spring 2007)
p.36.[ reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 6]
53

Craig Etcheson, Mapping Project of 1999: The Analysis, Documentation Center of Cambodia
(2007) p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11]
54

Craig Etcheson, Mapping Project of 1999: The Analysis, Documentation Ce nter of Cambodia
(2007) p.3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11]

10

time ordinary citizens were evacuated from Phnom Penh, both doctors and patient s in
hospitals were evacuated. “The pharmacies and pharmaceutical laboratories were the
first to be pillaged,” with all medicines and instruments being loaded into vehicles
and shipped to military regions. 55 During the evacuation many doctors were murdered
with their families; some went missing, while others “tried to conceal their identity in
order to survive.” 56 Trained physicians were replaced by what the People’s
Revolutionary Tribunal called “barefoot doctors.” 57
Under Khmer policy nurses were as young as 11 years old, and doctors were
qualified after a six month “refresher course.” 58 Medical equipment consisted of, “a
few syringes and a few blunt needles. The medicines included white, yellow, and dark
colored tablets.” 59
The distribution of medicine and injections were entrusted to the “nurses” who
often failed to give out the medicine or give the injections. It happened quite
often that antidiarrhea tablets were given to malaria patients and vice versa.
Injections were given from red, orange, or whi te solutions contained in old
orange squash bottles. It was noticed almost everywhere that before an
injection the nurse wiped the needle with his or her own fingers to disinfect it.
A needle was sometimes used for ten consecutive injections without
disinfection. 60
Horrific accounts of “experiments” conducted on those detained at S -21, vary
from watching open heart incisions heal, men being tied to stakes while their
gallbladders were removed to compare with that of a corpse, and studying intestines
55

Howard De Nike, Genocide in Cambodia, (Philadelphia, UPENN Press) 2000. p.326[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 34]
56

Id. at 328.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.

11

through open abdominal wounds. 61 Evidence from a Ministry of Social Action report,
noting the astounding number of doctors who were illiterate and age 13 -15,
demonstrates Khmer policy makers knew the ignorance of “physicians” serving in the
regime. 62 The PRT held that “Pol Pot intentionally lowered the standard of medical
care to an extremely low level causing the morbidity rate,” to [rise] ten times higher
than the birth rate. 63
C. Humanitarian Aid
In 1954, at the end of the Indochina war, the International Red Cross set up an
office in Phnom Penh. 64 This office agreed to help with all refugees and assist the
country with its goods office. Khmer policy makers however, “broke off all
relationships with international humanitarian organs,” and placed the Red Cros s under
the supervision of the Ministry of Public Health. 65 The Red Cross symbol was
removed from the building and all aid workers were forced to evacuate with other
citizens during the 1975 evacuation of Phnom Penh. 66 The Khmer Red Cross president
and members of its administrative council were killed by Khmer officials, leaving
only one surviving staff member. 67 As a consequence the Khmer Rouge denied all of
its citizens both free and detained the benefit of humanitarian aid.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 330

63

Id.

64

Id. at 339.

65

Id

66

Id.

67

Id. at 340.
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III.

SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Genocide
Genocide is the only international crime which has been codified by its own
international instrument. In the 1948 treaty definition, genocide constitutes, “any acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group, such as the following: (a) killing members of the group, (b) causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (c) deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part, (d) imposing measures to prevent births within the group, and (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.” 68
Documentation from the period spanning 1975-79 demonstrates a purposeful
extermination of ethnic Chams, Chinese, and Vietnamese. 69 However, evidence of
genocide during the time period covered in thi s memorandum does not suggest a death
by illness or starvation, but rather, immediate execution. 70 If the prosecution can
produce evidence that at least some members of detention camps were there based on
genocide’s enumerated classes, Khmer Rouge policy m akers could be charged for the
mass starvation and denial of medical services under the particular offenses of (1)
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (2) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to br ing about its physical

68
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destruction in whole or in part, and (3) imposing measures to prevent births within
the group.

B. Crimes Against Humanity.
Under Article 5 of the ECCC statute, in order to be tried under Crimes Against
Humanity (CAH), the Khmer policy maker charged must have committed an act as
part of a (1) widespread or systematic attack, (2) directed against any civilian
population, (3) on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds. 71
The first element, “widespread and systematic attack,” excludes acts that are a
general breakdown of law and order, or isolated criminal conduct. 72 This will most
likely be a Khmer policy maker’s first defense to any general charge of CAH. Named
as the figurehead by noted scholar on the Khmer Rouge, Ben Kiernan, Khieu
Samphan, “calls the evacuation something [he] was not expecting at all.”

73

Samphan,

and most likely all other Khmer policy makers will likely argue at trial that the
subsequent mass starvation and denial of medical services was a general breakdown of
the planned operation. However, this court should dismiss such claims based upon
evidence of a systematic and widespread removal of Phnom Penh residents, called for
by the Four Year Plan. Additionally, party documents reveal n ot only Sampan’s
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important role in the regime, but also general Khmer Rouge awareness of the looming
purges.

74

Khmer policy makers may secondarily argue insufficiency of evidence that the
mass starvation and denial of medical services experienced by thos e evacuated and
detained was part of the formal FYP policy instituted by the regime. This argument
should also fail. The trial chamber in the Tadic decision stated that, “a policy need not
be formalized and can be deduced from the way in which the acts occ ur.” The court
consequently found that acts occurring on a widespread or systematic basis
sufficiently demonstrate a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or not. 75
Although the FYP did not formally call for denial of medical services and mass
starvation, the ill-prepared systematic agricultural policy, as well as the widespread
execution of physicians and humanitarian organizations, demonstrates a policy which
fostered illness and starvation sufficient to fulfill the first element.
Finally, the defense may argue Khmer policy makers did not possess the
necessary intent to constitute a CAH. The mental element required to be proven is that
the accused was aware of or willfully blind to facts or circumstances which would
bring his or her acts within crimes against humanity. 76 The majority ruling in R. v.
Finta stated, “it is not necessary, however, to establish that the accused knew that his
actions were inhumane or that he knew exactly what would happen to the victims.” 77
The ICTY followed this analysis in Tadic and found that, “a crime against humanity
74
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does not require a concrete idea of the consequences or an abdominal attitude.” 78 The
ECCC should similarly find Khmer policy makers possessed the required intent by
making themselves willfully blind to the illness and starvation that would result from
adolescent physicians and an irrational agricultural plan.
The language of the third element under Article 5 of the ECCC statute requires
action be directed on national, ethnical, racial, or religio us grounds. 79 Rottensteiner, a
writer from the International Committee Red Cross, notes that a majority of sources
indicate that a discriminatory intent is not necessary for a charge of CAH. 80 Therefore,
while the prosecution could plausibly argue the FYP and detention camps were
directed on national grounds, a stronger argument can be made for the complete
exclusion of this element. The prosecution finds support for such exclusion through
the absence of such requirements in the Nuremburg Charter, the ILC draft code, and
the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR. 81 This argument is further supported by the
decision of the States to exclude this requirement in the ICC Statute. Therefore the
ECCC should find all requisite elements filled, and pursue the specific charges of, (1)
extermination, (2) torture, (3) persecution, and (3) other inhumane acts. 82

78
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1. Extermination
No international document previous to the ICC Statute specifically defined
extermination. 83 Extermination is defined by the ICC statute as, “the intentional
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.”

84

Considering the judgments of Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana, it is likely the
ECCC will similarly apply extermination to situations, “in which a group of
individuals who do not share any common characteristics are killed, or some members
are killed and others are spared.”
The Khmer policy makers will likely argue that they did not personally deny
detainees food or medical care. However, the act or omission that constitutes
extermination is not limited to the direct act of killing. The trial chamber in
Kayishema and Ruzindana found that extermination could be a result of, “imprisoning
a large number of people and withholding from them the necessities of life, resulting
in mass death…and preventing medical care.” 85 Therefore the court should dismiss
the defense’s claim and find Khmer policy makers guilty of instituting a policy which
imprisoned a large number of people and eliminated an y possibility of adequate
medical care. The meager medical services available were denied to those who were
sick. 86 Any who complained of infirmities were labeled as lazy traitors to the regime,
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and often sentenced to execution. 87 A similar fate awaited those who ate more than
the rice porridge given to agricultural workers. 88 Consequently, the ECCC should find
Khmer policy makers guilty for the specific charge of extermination in relation to the
mass starvation and denial of medical services experienced by both S-21 detainees and
agricultural workers as provided by Article 5 of the Statute.
2. Torture
Torture is not specifically defined in the ECCC statute, nor does one appear in
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute or Article 3 of the ICTR Statute. The ICC defi nes
torture as, “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused...” 89 The
defense may argue the mass starvation and denial of medical services experience d by
the agricultural and S-21 detainees was not ordered by or conducted by Khmer policy
makers. This argument should fail. Under Khmer Rouge control, the entire population
of Cambodia was forced to suffer at the hands of ill -trained doctors. 90 Those detained
at S-21 were intentionally denied care, or used as medical experiments as a direct
result of Khmer policy. 91 The denial of humanitarian aid inflicted severe suffering on
detained people who could have potentially had access to adequate medical care and
food. 92 Additionally, the ECCC may adopt the interpretation of ICC Statute Article 7
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that does not require the action be pursuant to or in furtherance of a state policy, thus,
“negating the requirement of official capacity of the perpetrator be explained. ” 93
Under either interpretation, the ECCC is likely to hold Khmer policy makers guilty of
torture.
3. Persecution
Both the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes include persecution as a Crime Against
Humanity as defined in ICC Article 7. The ECCC has taken a similar approach by
listing, “persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds,” under ECCC Statute
Article 5. As previously discussed under Genocide in Section III (A.), no evidence
suggests that any particular minority group was subject to the ma ss starvation and
denial of medical services experienced by ethnic Cambodians in the countryside and
at S-21. An argument can be made that the persecutory acts committed at S -21 were
on the basis of political affiliation, however, this argument is weak at best because it
does not account for the millions of ethnic Khmer that died as a result of the FYP.
The strongest argument should assert the ECCC interpret persecution as also,
“covering inhumane acts directed against enemy civilians not because they are
[minorities], partisans or political opponents but only because they belong to the
enemy." 94
The Tadic Trial Chamber held, “persecution can take numerous forms, so long
as the common element of discrimination in regard to the enjoyment of a basic or
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fundamental right is present.” 95 Tadic went on to apply this analysis in determining
that economic measures of a personal type such as the deprivation of food can
constitute persecutory acts. 96 Accordingly, the economic measures embedded in
Khmer policy, including the removal of all industry, deprivation of medicine to S-21
detainees based on association, prior education, and skill set, and denial of food to
non-Khmer officers and cadres, are measures of such a personal type consistent with
the holding in Tadic, to find such acts persecutory. 97
4. Other Inhumane Acts
This category of CAH is interpreted very broadly by international courts and is
likely the reason it goes undefined by the ECCC Statute., other inhumane acts in the
ICC Statute are mentioned at the end of the list of CAH stating, “other inhumane acts
are of a similar character of intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to
or to the mental of physical health.” 98 The ICC drafters’ goal was to ensure “that new
forms of crimes against humanity do not escape internation al criminal
responsibility.” 99 The ICTR Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana stated that
inhumane acts should be determined on a case-by-case basis and, “be of comparable
seriousness to other CAH.” 100 The ICTY however, more explicitly states in Articl e 5
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that the act “must cause injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental
integrity, health or human dignity.” 101
The ICTY definition and subsequent application are best fitting in reference to
Khmer policy makers. In the Nikolic indictment, the Prosecutor of the ICTY stated:
Nikolic committed a crime against humanity by participating in inhumane acts
against more than 500 civilians. [He did this] by endangering the health and
welfare of detainees, by providing inadequate food, and by providing living
conditions failing to meet minimal basic standards. 102
Similarly, the Khmer policy makers can be charged with “other inhumane acts” for
providing inadequate food and substandard living conditions for both civilians made
to work in the rice paddies and for those detained in torture camps.

C. Breaches of the Geneva Convention
Article 6 of the ECCC statute gives the court jurisdiction over Grave Breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which are any of the following acts
committed against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Conventions:
(a)

Willful killings;

(b)

Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;

(c)

Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;

(d)

Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;

101
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(e)

Compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a
hostile power;

(f)

Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial;

(g)

Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of civilians;

(h)

Taking civilians as hostages. 103

The agreement between the ECCC and the United Nations promulgates that each crime
will be prosecuted in accordance with Cambodian law when def ined, or where
applicable, appropriate international standards. 104 The international standard for the
elements of Grave Breaches has been best analyzed by the ICC and have been
followed by the ICTY, the ICTR, and will most likely be followed by the ECCC. 105
1.

Element:
a. International Armed Conflict
i. International in Nature
Under Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, Grave Breaches only apply to

situations of international armed conflict. Similar to Israel concerning the West Bank,
Iraq concerning Kuwait, and by Indonesia regarding East Timor, Khmer policy makers
will very likely contest the applicability of the statute in non -international conflict.” 106
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The Defense will most likely argue the ECCC adopt the ICTY’s traditional view
towards its Article 2 concerning Grave Breaches, (sharing language very similar to
ECCC statute Article 6), which held that the prohibition only applied to international
armed conflicts. The prosecution should rebut this argument citing the contradicting
language of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic which argued, “a strong case can be made
for the application of Article 2, even when the incriminated act takes place in an
internal conflict.” 107 Further, the Delalic Judgment states, “customary law has
developed the Geneva Conventions’ provisions to constitute an extension of the
system of Grave Breaches to internal armed conflict.” 108 Additionally, the Trial
Chamber of Aleksovski echoed these same sentiments. 109 Thus the ECCC will most
likely apply Article 6 concerning Grave Breaches despite the internal nature of the
Khmer Rouge policies.
ii. Status as an Armed Conflict
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic established that an armed conflict exists if,
“there is a resort to armed forces between states or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
state.” 110 The defense may argue that the regime existed with no resistance by the
Cambodian people and thus does not constitute an “armed conflict” as defined by the
1997/21, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, para. 74 (1998). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
39]
107
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Tadic Appeals Chamber. The ECCC should dismiss this argument. Article 2 finds
“armed conflict” in situations of partial or tot al occupation of the territory of a party
to the Convention even if the occupation meets no resistance. 111 Consequently,
although the Khmer Rouge met no resistance to the FYP or S -21 detention camp, the
existence of total occupation by the regime fulfills all necessary requirements for the
ECCC to find “armed conflict” under the Geneva Convention. 112
b. Protected Person or Property
The second basic element of Grave Breaches is that the act must have been
committed against a person or property protected by t he relevant Geneva
Convention. 113 The ECCC statute specifically protects “civilians.” 114 When the
Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict took place various cases before the ICTY involved
perpetrators and victims of the same nationality. 115 The ICTY Appeals Chamber
discussion in Tadic concerning whether Article 8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute extends
protection to persons who are of the same nationality as their alleged perpetrators,
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may raise issue in the ECCC. 116 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Alekovski discussed
that matter in detail and found:
In the words of the Tadic Judgment, the primary purpose of Article 4: is to
ensure the safeguards afforded by the Convention to those civilians who do not
enjoy the diplomatic protection, and correlatively are not subject to the
allegiance and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves.
In granting its protection, Article 4 intends to look to the substance of relations,
not to their legal characterization as such. 117
The court consequently expanded the interpretation of Article 4 so that a person may
be accorded, “protection status notwithstanding the fact that he is of the same
nationality as his captors.” 118 Under this interpretation the ECCC should grant
protection under its Article 6 provision for Grave Breaches to all Cambodians affected
by the Khmer Rouge policies despite sharing the same nationality.
c. Nexus between “Armed Conflict” and Particular Offense
Finally, this court must be concerned with the nexus between the “armed
conflict” and the particular offenses of denial of medical services and mass starvation.
It is likely the ECCC will adopt the ICTY interpretation of this element:
The existence of an armed conflict or occupation and the applicability of
international humanitarian law to the territory is not sufficient to create
international jurisdiction over each and every serious crime committed in the
territory…For a crime to fall within the jurisdiction of the International
Tribunal a sufficient nexus must be established between the all eged offense and
the armed conflict which gives rise to the applicability of international
humanitarian law. 119
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The Tadic court accordingly found that for a sufficient nexus to exist, an offense must
be in fact related to the armed conflict as a whole. 120 It would be sufficient for the
prosecution to prove that the mass starvation and denial of medical services occurred
in, “the course or as part of the hostilities in, or occupation of, an area controlled by
one of the parties.” 121 It would not be necessary, however, to show that armed conflict
was occurring at the exact same time and place as the detention and inflicted
famine. 122
In Delalic all the alleged acts took place within the confines of a prison camp
similar to S-21, operated by the governmental authorities. The Trial Chamber found
that the prisoners were arrested and detained as a result of FYP - like military
operations conducted on behalf of the government. 123 The ICTY’s conclusion that
there is a clear nexus between the armed conflict in Bosnia an d Herzegovina, and the
acts committed is one that can easily be echoed in relation to the prison camps of the
Khmer regime, considering the striking similarity in circumstances. 124
Consequently, under Article 6 of the ECCC Statute, in reference to Grave
Breaches of the Geneva Convention, mass starvation and denial of medical services
fulfill all necessary elements to press charges of inhumane treatment, willful killing,
and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.
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2. Acts
a. Willful Killing
Killing persons not taking part in hostilities, notably those protected under the
Geneva Conventions, amounts to a war crime. Many forced to evacuate from hospitals
died as a result of the trek; orphans left alone without doctors or par ents faced
imminent death; prisoners forced to participate in medical experiments either died
immediately or as a result of the crude procedures inflicted upon them. The defense
will likely argue that the mass starvation and denial of medical services that took
place were not direct a result of their actions. The Delalic Trial Chamber noted that,
“omissions as well as concrete actions can satisfy the actus reus requirement of willful
killing under the Geneva Convention.” 125 Samphan stated in an interview that at one
point he saw a hospital overflowing with bodies and blood everywhere, but never
intervened on behalf of those detained. 126
Besides the ICTY’s Delalic case, the ICTR’s Akayesu Trial Chamber confirmed
the required mental element for killing includes a similar kind of recklessness
demonstrated by Khmer officials. In Akayesu, “ the Trial chamber required that at the
time of the killing the accused or a subordinate had the intention to kill or inflict
bodily harm on the deceased having known that such bo dily harm is likely to cause the
victims death, and is reckless whether the death ensues or not.” 127 Official party
documents demonstrate that Khmer Rouge officers had thorough knowledge of
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everyday occurrences at the detention centers, yet took no steps to improve the level
of medical care or treatment of prisoners. The ECCC can infer from Khmer Rouge
policy demonstrable, “foreseeability of death as a consequence of the [enacted
policies] [and] the taking of an excessive risk,” fulfilling the actus reus ele ment. 128
The defense may argue that case law from other Tribunals should not be used
as binding but rather the wording of ICC Article 30 requiring “intent and knowledge,”
should be adopted by the ECCC. 129 The prosecution should concede that the ICC
Statute does, “include a higher threshold for establishing the required mental element
for crimes such as murder and killing.” 130 However, ICC Article 28 specifically
provides exceptions applicable to Khmer Rouge policy makers, “concerning the
responsibility of commanders and other superiors,” stating that proven elements of
negligence or recklessness are sufficient to fulfill the actus reus requirement. 131
b.

Inhumane treatment and willfully causing great sufferin g or serious injury
to body or health.
The ideas of inhumane treatment and willfully causing great suffering or

serious injury to body and health are very closely intertwined. The interpretation of
the ICTY Trial Chamber in Delalic was that, “acts which are inconsistent with the
principle of humanity, constitute examples of actions that can be characterized as
inhumane treatment. These acts thus can include torture and willfully causing great
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suffering.” 132 The Delalic Trial Chamber “ultimately considered the question of
whether any particular act constitutes inhumane treatment —which does not fall within
the ambit of torture or willfully causing great suffering —to be a question of fact to be
judged in the circumstances of the particular case.” 133
As the Tribunal trend seems to lean towards separating the two based on
“attacks on human dignity” versus” moral suffering,” the ECCC may have a difficult
task upholding charges of both inhumane treatment and willfully causing suffering or
great injury to body, mental, or physical health. 134 While the mass starvation and
denial of medical services may have been morally wrong and caused great pain and
suffering to those exposed to it, Boot outlines several examples of what Tribunals
have found to be specifically inhumane:
Forcing a father and son to physically beat each other, leading detainees to
plead for mercy so as not to be stunned by an electric cattle prod, and forcing
brothers to perform oral sex on each other before other prisoners, and the use of
persons as human shields can be characterized as inhumane. 135
Based on international trends in this aspect of Grave Breaches, and the evidence of
how detainees were starved and medically abused, the prosecution will most likely
experience better success pursing only specific charges of willfully causing suffering
or great injury to body, mental, or physical health, rather than the more difficult to
define charge of “inhumane treatment.”
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IV

FORESEEABILITY
Despite differences in laws regarding Genocide, Crimes Again st Humanity, and

Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention, in order to draw a distinction between an
ordinary crime and a crime of war there must be knowledge on the part of the official
of the circumstances surrounding the charged offense. “At the interna tional level
what is required is not the secondary offender actually foresaw the criminal conduct
likely to be taken by the primary offender, the test is rather whether a man of
reasonable prudence would have foresee that conduct under the circumstances
prevailing at the time.” 136 The international theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)
is a direct off-spring of the domestic concept of foreseeability under the theory of
conspiracy.
A.

Joint Criminal Enterprise
The theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise centers around the thought that each

participant in a criminal plan can be held individually liable for smaller crimes that
come together in the scope of the larger criminal scheme. This theory will be integral
to the ECCC’s prosecution of Khmer policy makers for the starvation and illness
experienced by those detained due to the consistent denial of actual knowledge that
such conditions were in effect under the FYP. 137 Under JCE the Khmer policy maker’s
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knowledge of the actual mass starvation and denial of medical services is not a
necessary prerequisite to finding liability.

138

The objective elements of JCE are: (1) A plurality of persons; (2) Involved in
an express or implied common plan or purpose; (3) Participation can ranging from
actually committing the crime to assisting and contributing to its commission. 139
Under the three types of JCE described by Cassese, the Khmer policy makers will
likely only fall under JCE 2 and JCE 3.

1. JCE 1
The first category of JCE is more widespread and extends liability for, “acts
agreed upon when making the common plan or design. Here all the participants share
the same intent to commit the concert crime, although only some of them may have
physically perpetrated the crime.” 140 In Tadic, the JCE 1 shared intent was to rid the
Prijedor region of the non-Serb population, by committing inhumane acts. 141 There is
no evidence of a similar shared intent to commit a crime in the case at bar. The FYP
and detention camps were crafted by policy makers with the intent to make Cambodia
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a strong economic and political force; consequently , without a specific purpose to
cause starvation, illness, and death, JCE 1 does not apply in the instant case. 142
2. JCE 2
The second category of JCE extends liability for, “carrying out a criminal task
within an institutional framework such as an intern ment or concentration camp.” 143
The intent necessary to continue a JCE 2 can be inferred from the accused’s
knowledge of the continued perpetration of ill treatment at the camp and the continued
participation in the continuance. 144 In Kvocka the ICTY Trial Chamber found the
accused guilty of JCE 2 for participation in a shared intent to persecute and subjugate
non Serb detainees. 145 Similarly, the detention camps and “system of repression”
enforced on those evacuated to the countryside, fulfill the requisite elements of JCE 2
in which the “accused’s active participation in the enforcement of a system of
repression together with knowledge of the nature of the system and the intent to
further the common concerted design to ill-treat inmates” creates liability through
obvious foresight of possible mistreatment such as starvation and denial of medical
services. 146
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3. JCE 3
To establish liability under the third category of JCE, the prosecution must
show that the accused had the intention to contribute to a JCE, an d that he/she knew
that the crime that actually occurred might be committed by one of the other members
of the group and so took that chance by continuing to participate in the JCE.” 147 The
defense may argue that liability cannot be established under this category of JCE for
failure to contribute to a criminal plan. The court should dismiss this argument.
Under Article 5 of the ECCC Statute the forced removal of an ethnic group from an
area, however, can be charged as a Crime Against Humanity.
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found under a JCE 2 analysis, the “accused’s active participation in the enforcement
of a system of repression together with knowledge of the nature of the system and the
intent to further the common concerted design to ill -treat inmates” again creates
liability under JCE 3, through obvious foresight of possible mistreatment such as
starvation and denial of medical services. 149
B. Defenses to JCE
In any category of liability, the prosecution must prove that the Khmer Rouge
policy makers had knowledge of a specific fact or circumstance evincing the
likelihood that the Khmer Rouge cadres and lower officers might allow starvation and
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illness to run rampant in the countryside and in detention camps. 150 This may be
difficult to prove regarding those in forced labor, due to the fact that Khmer Rouge
policy makers may not have reasonably not foreseen mass starvation of a population;
for reason that they were not knowledgeable about the production of rice or any other
aspect of agriculture to anticipate the lack of food production.
The prosecution should rebut this defense by citing Tadic in which the ICTY
Trial Chamber held that all participants in the common plan will be held criminally
responsible where the natural and foreseeable consequence that occurs was predictable
and the accused was ether reckless or indifferent to that risk. 151 The defense will
likely argue that the policies instituted by the Kh mer Rouge were for the betterment of
Cambodian society and that any deaths were unintended casualties resulting from the
necessary social transformation. 152 However, Khmer Rouge officer knowingly
instituted policies of torture and maltreatment and consequently, took the risk that
subordinates might carry out crimes not enumerated in the common plan such as the
mass starvation and denial of medical services experienced by detainees. Hence, by
participating in the co-authoring and implementing of Khmer Rouge policies, Khmer
Rouge officers showed the intent necessary to be charged with participation in a
common criminal plan under the doctrine of JCE.
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The prosecution also has the burden of proving “whether the general
circumstances of the commission of the agreed crime were such as to make it
extremely likely, hence foreseeable, that other incidental crimes be committed.” 153 In
the instant case, Cassese suggests that foreseeability is not based on the actual Khmer
knowledge of mass starvation and denial medical services, but rather on the policy
maker’s knowledge of cadres and lower ranking officers placed in charge of
implementing its policy. 154 The ECCC could find Khmer policy makers liable for
starvation and illness if it was foreseeable based on the history of cadres and lower
ranking officers, that extreme and cruel measures would likely be taken to implement
FYP policies. 155 This burden should easily be fulfilled by the prosecution considering
the amount evidence available from general factual accounts reporting the extreme
measures taken by all levels of Khmer military officials to fulfill FYP policies. 156
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. JCE versus Co-Perpetration
Determining what level of foreseeability is necessary in order to obtain a
conviction for illness and starvation raises an interesting policy issue concerning the
appropriate application of the JCE doctrine. 157 The ITCY Trial Chamber in Simic
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argued that, “JCE does not have any substance of its own and is nothing more than a
new label affixed to a since long well-known concept or doctrine in many jurisdictions
as well as in international criminal law, namely co -perpetration.” 158 Alternately the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Stakic held that co-perpetration:
does not have support in customary international law or in the settle
jurisprudence of the Tribunal which is binding on the Trial Chambers. By way
of contrast, joint criminal enterprise is a mode of liabil ity which is firmly
establish in customary international law and is routinely applied in the
tribunal’s jurisprudence. 159
If adopted by the ECCC, the prosecution will likely be able to gain a conviction under
the JCE doctrine with ease. Consequently, it is probable that the defense will bring
before the court an argument similar to that of the Simic Trial Chamber stating that
the ECCC should not adopt the theory of JCE because it relies on civil law concepts
and common law categories to create Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute outlining
JCE. 160 In order to prevail on this matter, the prosecution must successfully argue that
despite the use of such language, the “basic soundness of the concept” is centered on
international case law.
B. JCE versus Aiding and Abetting
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kvocka, “does not clearly distinguish between
the responsibility of a participant in JCE and that of an aider and abettor,” finding that
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in, “both cases a substantial contribution is necessary.” 161 Consequently a
foreseeability argument could be made under either doctrine. In a JCE, in addition to
adhering to a criminal plan and, “sharing the intent to commit a crime, the accused
willingly runs the risk that another participant may perpetrate a further crime that the
former had forseen.” 162 The elemental requirement of shared intent, produce a
weightier burden than that of an aider or abettor who, “does not share, either at the
outset or later, the criminal intent of the perpetrator; but instead only intends to assist
the perpetrator in the commission of a crime.” 163 Consequently, although the
prosecution can argue Khmer Rouge liability under the doctrine of foreseeability as an
aider or abettor; it should be well prepared for a defense motion for a heavier burden
of proof as required by JCE in order to obtain convictions for mass starvation and
denial of medical services under Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, and Grave
Breaches of the Geneva Convention.

C. Liability without Culpability
The defense will likely make an argument that the doctrine of JCE, “disregards
the necessity that a person be held guilty only if his culpability has been proven.” 164
Although this argument has merit, several public policy considerations concerning the
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protection of society support the use of the doctrine. First, at an international level
the policies of starvation and denial of medical services imple mented by the Khmer
Rouge were massive and of extreme gravity; moreover they were perpetrated under
exceptional circumstances of detention and torture. Officers involved in designing
Khmer Rouge policies should have been alert to the possible consequences of their
actions and legitimately expect to be held accountable.
Second, in upholding the purpose and tradition of the Tribunals, the gravity of
the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge, “makes it necessary for the world
community to prevent and punish serious misconduct to the maximum extent allowed
by the principle of legality;” 165 which is most properly exercised under the doctrine of
JCE. Third, as opposed to domestic law, international criminal law has no fixed scale
of penalties; consequently, courts are free to impose a sentence appropriate to the
level of culpability determined.

VI.

CONCLUSION
The mass starvation and denial of medical services experienced by those

detained in prisons and evacuated to the Cambodian country side cannot be charged as
genocide due to the fact that evidence demonstrates that only Cambodian citizens
were forced to work in rice paddies and live in detention camps, while other ethnic,
racial, and national groups were summarily executed. Based on the requirements of
the ECCC Statute, while Genocide may be charged for similar treatment of other
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minority groups, it cannot be charged for the starvation and illness experienced by
Cambodian citizens.
The widespread and systematic nature of starvation and denial of medical
services can, however, be charged as a Crime Against Humanity for its persecutory
nature, as well as for its use as a means of execution of low security prisoners and
torture at S-21. Additionally, the purposeful interference with humanitarian aid
serves a contributory factor in specific CAH charges found under other inhumane acts.
Although the Khmer Rouge regime used mass starvation and denial of medical
services against its own people rather than against those of another State in an
international armed crisis, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions supports a
conviction for Grave Breaches under the specific charges of willful killing and willful
injury to mental and physical health.
All three charges of war crimes (Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and
Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions) require that policy makers have a specific
knowledge or intent to commit the offense. In charging Khmer Rouge policy makers
with Crimes Against Humanity and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention under
the JCE theory, the ECCC prosecution can meet its burden under categories 2 and 3 of
JCE. Khmer Rouge policy makers need not have specifically known or intended to
commit the specific crime of mass starvation or denial of medical services to be held
liable. Rather, the overwhelming abundance of evidence points to the holding of
Khmer Rouge policy makers liable based on general policies that created
circumstances such that it was reasonably foreseeable the such acts would be
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committed by cadres and lower ranking Khmer Rouge officers in furtherance of
Khmer Rouge policy.
There is an emerging Tribunal trend leaning towards using the doctrine of JCE
to convict military officers for crimes committed under instituted policies. Because
JCE has yet to be officially codified, several arguments assert that the standard is
overly broad and is confusingly similar to domesti c concepts of co-perpetration and
aiding and abetting. In upholding the tradition and purpose of the Tribunals the
ECCC will most likely take into consideration the need for Khmer Rouge officials to
be held accountable for the atrocities committed in the regime and choose to adopt the
doctrine despite such assertions.

40

